

"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

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GENL. O. O. HOWARD'S

Personal Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion.

CHAMBERSBURG RAID.

Lee Takes the Initiative—McClellan's Advance.

A BRUSH WITH STUART.

Burnside Succeeds to the Command of the Army.

By Major-General O. O. Howard, U. S. A.
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XXI.—Continued.

On the 6th of October, 1862, after his return to Washington, President Lincoln directed our army to cross into Virginia and give battle to the enemy while the roads were good. He thought, as he always had before, that we might move along a line east of the Blue Ridge, and promised a re-enforcement of 30,000 men provided this be done.

The suggestion troubled McClellan, for it disconnected his favorite plan—namely, to strike directly for Lee's army in the direction of Winchester. This plan, as soon as our bridge was completed, would afford us railroad communication for our bread and forage, and would keep up an effective bar against another invasion of Maryland. Taking advantage of this frank dissent from the President's suggestion of route, General Halleck belatedly McClellan because he did not move, declaring that the enemy was falling back, and that our troops showed "a decided want of leg."

But before the army actually moved across the Potomac, and while we were making every preparation to do so, the enemy, clearly taking in the situation, himself took the initiative.

THE CHAMBERSBURG RAID.

The 5th of October Stuart set out from the Potomac with a force of about eighteen hundred to two thousand cavalry and four pieces of horse artillery. He hurried on northward till he got beyond the flank of Pleasanton and Franklin, and crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ford, not far from the town of Hancock. Having accurate information, he avoided every Yankee detachment, and though he coveted Hagerstown, with its abundant supplies, he did not dare try that city, but sped on to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, ran in a flag of truce at once, and finding no authorities or guards, concerted with the principal citizens, and placed Wade Hampton in command for the night. In the morning he paroled a large number of sick and wounded soldiers, destroyed an abundance of arms and ammunition, trains of cars, manufactories, and gathered in all the good horses which the neighborhood could furnish. Our troops were immediately put upon his track; Cox and Crook, going past the village of Hancock toward West Virginia, were stopped, and everybody waked up from Williamsport to Pottsville. But yet the venture was made. Stuart ran on through Gettysburg, Emmittsburg, and near Frederick, till he came to the neighborhood of Stoneman's infantry. He avoided the infantry under the cover of a little skirmishing, and, not far from Pottsville, recrossed the Potomac just as Pleasanton, who had marched nearly a hundred miles in twenty-four hours, began to skirmish with his rear-guard. This was a second daring cavalry raid which swept completely across our army, composed of all arms, and numbering more than a hundred thousand men. It was because Stuart took but few men with him, and those superbly mounted.

I think I had returned to the field, to encounter extraordinary excitement, exposure and hardship, too soon after losing my arm; for just after this troublesome raid I was taken ill of a slow fever; so that, under medical advice, I obtained a twenty-day sick leave and left Harper's Ferry for home. But by the time I reached Philadelphia my fever abated and my appetite returned—in fact, I was so thoroughly convalescent that I was almost disposed to turn back to the army, yet, judging by the past few weeks, I concluded that there would be no movement; so that, to gather further strength from the change and the journey, I made a brief visit to my friends in Maine, and then hastened back to my post, arriving at Harper's Ferry the 5th of November, 1862, about ten o'clock at night. My brigade surgeon, Dr. Palmer, being left behind in charge of the sick and wounded, gave welcome to Captain Whittlessey and myself, and left us for the night.

MCCLELLAN'S ADVANCE.

The army had gone. McClellan had decided to take President Lincoln's suggestion and move east of the Blue Ridge. By the close of the 25th of October he had three brigades in readiness—one at Berlin and one over the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry; also, another across the Potomac at that point. Everything being now fairly in readiness, the march was commenced the morning of the 26th. There were slight changes in commanders—Couch having our corps (the 2d), and Sigel the 12th; Sumner remaining in charge of the two. The 5th and 6th corps retained the same chiefs, Porter and Franklin, each having been enlarged to three divisions. Wilson had succeeded Reno (killed in battle), and John F. Reynolds had the first corps in place of Hooker (wounded). These two were still under Burnside's direction. The new troops promised from the defenses of the capital were commanded by Sigel, Heintzelman and Bayard, the latter having only one division of cavalry. General Sumner's command was immediately divided, the 12th corps being left behind to guard the fords of the upper Potomac.

The main body of the army, now brisk and happy and hopeful, though it rained in torrents when it set out, moved rapidly up the valley of the Catoctin, a valley situated between the Blue Ridge and the Ball Run range. Our corps, followed by the 5th, had crossed the Shenandoah near its mouth and passed directly into the little valley, which was to be the general route of the army. Pleasanton's cavalry was in advance, and occupied successively the gaps in the Blue Ridge. The different corps were kept within supporting distance of each other during the march, yet by the time the rear-guard had crossed the Potomac, the 26th of November, the head of column was already in the vicinity of Snicker's Gap. Mr. Lincoln's policy proved correct. General Lee,

with Longstreet's wing, with very little cavalry, made a parallel march up the Shenandoah, so that by the time we had touched Snicker's Gap, two of the passes of the Blue Ridge further up—Chester and Thornton's—were even then in use passing the material and troops of the enemy to the vicinity of Culpeper.

THE CAVALRY REUNION.
Jackson, preceded by Stuart's cavalry, hurried on to head us off, marching from his camp near the Opequon to Millwood, a little town near the Shenandoah, where the Ashby Gap road crosses that river. Stuart kept his outposts in watch along the Blue Ridge. Considerable skirmishing and some artillery firing occurred here and there between his cavalry and Pleasanton's. While our corps—the 2d—was at Snicker's Gap, Pleasanton rushed on to get possession of Ashby's. It will be remembered that this point is where the Fairfax turnpike, crossing the Bull Run range at Aldie by a due west course, intersects the Blue Ridge as this road passes into the Shenandoah Valley. Pleasanton did not succeed in reaching the Gap immediately, for at the little town of Union he encountered Stuart's advance. Here there was a sharp encounter. The enemy being dislodged, retired to the neighborhood of Upperville. Here again Stuart posted his command—horse artillery and cavalry—in a strong position, with the little town behind him. This position was occupied to prevent our seeing the Gap itself, or at least to delay our march. But Pleasanton lost no time; he fiercely encountered Stuart, broke his line and drove his troops from the field in disorder. A division of Stuart lingered in this neighborhood, holding a defile as late as the 4th of November, when our infantry came up to the assistance of the cavalry.

Avrell, on our side, and Rosser, on the enemy's, participated in these sudden and sharp conflicts. But, curiously enough, Stoneman, with all his infantry and artillery, rested quietly at Millwood and allowed the enemy to pass successively without hindrance from him. Possibly his mysterious conduct was intended to threaten Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington, or McClellan's more immediate rear with another Jacksonian raid, with which our comrades are already very familiar.

STUART AGAIN REPLIED.

After Stuart's repulse at Ashby, he hastened on with what cavalry he could collect to Chester Gap. D. H. Hill's Confederate division was there. Longstreet left him as a rear-guard to stay as long as possible and keep up communication with the Shenandoah Valley and Jackson. At this Gap, as they came from the Shenandoah, the road forked—one branch leading south through Sandy Hook and Flat Hill, and the other branch running east to intersect the Valley road, upon which our forces were marching. The point of intersection is called Barber's Cross-roads, some eight or ten miles from the Gap. Stuart pressed his cavalry forward to these cross-roads, where he found a favorable position. He was in waiting, the morning of the 5th, when Pleasanton's command approached. Without the slightest hesitation our cavalry attacked his position. Farnsworth's charge down the main road, with the 8th Illinois, was stopped by the enemy's fire from behind obstructions, but Pleasanton, bearing to the west, managed to secure the Chester Gap road, where he in turn waited for Stuart's attack. The sharp fire of the carbines broke Stuart's column as it advanced. At that very moment that enterprising officer, Colonel B. F. Davis, who had refused to surrender at Harper's Ferry, and had made his way out in a most unexpected manner, here, with his 5th New York cavalry, with drawn sabers, made upon Stuart's right flank one of his fiercest charges. By this work of Pleasanton's, Stuart's command was not only repulsed, but driven off to the other road. Pleasanton pursued him through Flat Hill as far as Sandy Hook. Meanwhile, Avrell's division had seized and was holding Manassas Gap.

PREPARING TO GIVE BATTLE.

While this exciting work of the cavalry was going on, the army was quietly transferred to the vicinity of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Sigel's 14th corps, and part of Heintzelman's, with Bayard's cavalry, had marched out from Washington and were holding Thoroughfare Gap, New Baltimore, and Warrenton Junction. Reynolds' corps was at Warrenton, Wilcox's at Waterloo; ours (the 2d) at Rectortown, while Porter's and Franklin's were not far in the rear, toward Upperville—McClellan's headquarters being at Rectortown. This was the situation of the army the evening of the 6th of November—pretty well concentrated, and, surely, well prepared to strike D. H. Hill's division, make a break between Longstreet and Jackson, and force the former to a battle at a disadvantage.

Whatever bold project was in Lee's or Jackson's mind, it certainly had been interrupted by McClellan's holding his main body so tenaciously west of the Bull Run range.

On the morning of the 6th, with a borrowed horse and an ambulance, Whittlessey and I crossed the Shenandoah and pulled on with all the speed we could command after the army. We rode up the Catoctin valley over an unguarded road. From the poor condition of our horses we had to be satisfied with thirty-five miles the first day. The next day, the 7th, getting an early start, we made Rectortown by 11 a. m. Owing to a severe snow-storm, that portion of the army near Rectortown and the general headquarters did not stir. Immediately upon my arrival I visited General McClellan; found him and his adjutant-general, Seth Williams, together in a comfortable tent. From them I received a cordial welcome. McClellan thought I must be a Jonah, to bring such a storm, and was half-minded to order me back. He said that they were talking of me and were really glad to see me. I went there to our corps, and was pleasantly welcomed by our new commander, General Couch, and very soon fell into the old place—the headquarters of the 2d division. Here, surrounded by my staff, I was in heart again, for it had been a great cross to arrive at Harper's Ferry and find the army several days ahead of me, and in the enemy's front.

MCCLELLAN AGAIN REMOVED.

One may imagine my surprise and sincere regret when I heard, this same night, that McClellan had been removed, and Burnside assigned to the command of the army.

The evening of the 6th, General Buckingham, an officer on duty in the War Office, had been made, by General Halleck and Secretary Stanton, the bearer of dispatches—one, the President's order relieving McClellan, and the other, Halleck's instructions to Burnside. Buckingham went during the 7th to Burnside, first finding him about fifteen miles south of

SAVING THE NATION.

The Story of the War Retold for Our Boys and Girls.

MCCLELLAN'S RETREAT.

Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern Hill.

LOST OPPORTUNITIES.

The Ignominious Close of the Peninsular Campaign.

By "Carleton."
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XX.

To the Boys and Girls of the United States:

It is only nine miles from Fair Oaks to Malvern Hills, but White Oak Swamp lies between them. There were only two narrow roads across the swamp. There was no time to construct new ones. General McClellan must, in changing his base, carry food sufficient to last him a week. The soldiers took three days' rations in their haversacks; three days more were taken in the wagons, and a herd of twenty-five hundred cattle were driven in advance.

While the cannon were still thundering on the north side of the Chickahominy at Gaines' Mills, the long line of wagons were in motion toward White Oak Swamp. All through the night they moved. The game of war is not exactly like a game of checkers—for, in playing checkers, one side moves at a time; but in war both sides move at the same moment. Strategy in war is to deceive your opponent and so gain an advantage.

HOW GENERAL LEE RECEIVED HIMSELF.

General Lee had made the movement from Richmond to crush that portion of the Union army that was north of the Chickahominy. He had sent Jackson to march to strike the railroad, and cut off McClellan from York River. He expected to see the Union army abandoning their lines in front of Richmond and retreating towards Williamsburg. When the sun rose the 28th of June, 1862, he discovered that the Union troops were still along the Chickahominy. He was pleased. They were not thinking of retreating. He would reorganize his army—for he had lost more than ten thousand men—and let the soldiers rest a day, care for the wounded, and then move east, get behind McClellan and York River, and turn the defeat into a rout. Through the day General Lee never mistrusted what McClellan was doing. Magruder, who has twenty-five thousand men guarding Richmond, at noon thinks that the Union troops are leaving their intrenchments, and sends General Tombs, with the 7th and 8th Georgia, to charge the Union lines; but Hancock's brigade pours in a fire, killing and wounding more than two hundred, and Magruder finds that he has been mistaken. Not till 9 o'clock the next morning, when the fog lifts, does General Lee discover how he has deceived himself. He finds that McClellan has abandoned York River; that the vessels which were at White House have disappeared; that the mountain of supplies has been removed, or what could not be taken away has been set on fire.

MCCLELLAN'S DISPATCH.

General McClellan sent a last dispatch to Secretary Stanton: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." It was disconcerting. If the Secretary of War and President Lincoln had made mistakes, so had General McClellan. He had moved slowly; had always over-estimated the enemy; divided his army, and shown little capacity as a commanding general. It was a grave offense to charge President Lincoln and the Secretary of War with seeking to destroy our army.

We need not wonder that General McClellan felt very sore when, instead of marching on toward Richmond, he was moving away from it. He had been defeated in a great battle, and defeat is hard to bear.

Savage's Station.

The troops detailed to hold the ground while the trains crossed White Oak Swamp were Franklin's corps, which had the right, Sumner's in the center, and Heintzelman's on the left, nearest Richmond. They faced north. There was a misunderstanding of orders, and, at noon, June 29th, Heintzelman left his position and took up his line of march across the swamp, which exposed Sumner's left flank. Through Sunday forenoon Lee's troops were working like beavers to repair the bridges, and during the afternoon his troops began to march across the Chickahominy, while others pushed out from Richmond to strike Sumner's left flank.

Through the long Sabbath hours Sumner's troops stood upon the wide plain facing north, motionless almost as statues, while the long wagon trains moved into the woods towards the South. They were the rear-guard, and on them depended the salvation of the army. Following the wagons were thousands of sick and wounded, working their way towards the swamp, urged on by hope of escaping the hands of the Confederates. It was heart-rending to hear the words of those who were too badly wounded to be moved, or who could not be taken away.

The sun went down. Evening was coming on; yet the twenty thousand men remained upon that field awaiting the attack—three lines of resolute, determined soldiers. Brooks', Hancock's and Burnside's brigades were in front, with Osborn's, Brannan's, Hazard's and Pettit's batteries—twenty-four guns.

It was past 5 o'clock before Lee opened the battle. An hour passed of constant artillery firing. Then the Confederates advanced across the wide and level plain with yellings and howlings.

There was a stream of fire from Sumner's line—a steady outpouring of deadly volleys. There were answering volleys from the Confederate lines. Sumner's batteries left off firing shell and threw canister, and the lines, which had advanced so triumphantly, were sent in confusion across the field. Again they advanced and were repulsed. Longstreet and Jackson, once more under cover of the gathering darkness, urged on their reluctant troops. Sumner brought up his reserve brigades. It


was a short, sharp struggle—a wild night tempest—the roaring of fifty cannon and thirty thousand muskets. The evening was calm. Not a breath of air stirred the leaves of the trees. The stars shone brightly. Strange the fate of a man who drops from the ranks of the Confederates.

"Who are you?" asked an officer of the 5th Vermont, dimly seeing a regiment in the darkness. There was a momentary silence, and then the question came back, "Who are you?" "The 5th Vermont."

"Let them have it, boys!" were the words of command shouted by the Confederate officer. The Vermonters heard it. There was no flinching. Instantly their rifles came to their cheeks.

There were two broad flashes of light, two rows of dead and wounded. But the Vermonters held their ground, and the Confederates, shattered, repulsed, disappeared in the gloom of night. It was hard for the brave men to go away from their fallen comrades and leave them upon the field which they had defended with their life's blood, but it was impossible to remove them, and the long lines closed in upon the wagons, marched down the forest road, and at daylight were south of White Oak Swamp.

BATTLE OF GLENDALE.



1 Smith and Richardson. A Jackson. Ewell and 2 Slocum. D. H. Hill.
3 Kearney. B. A. P. Hill and Longstreet.
4 Hooker. C. Newmarket road.
5 McClellan. D. Quaker road.

"Glendale" is the euphemism name given by Mr. Nelson to his farm, which is located two miles south of White Oak Swamp. It is a place where several roads meet—from the north, the swamp road; from the east, the Long Bridge road; from the south, the road leading to Malvern Hills; from the southwest, the Newmarket road; from the northwest, the Charles City road, leading to Richmond. There are farm-houses, groves, ravines, wheat-fields waving with grain. Upon the Malvern road there is a church. West of the church a half mile is the mansion of Mr. Frazier, where the Confederate lines were formed on the 30th of June.

At sunrise on that morning all the divisions of the Union army were south of the swamp. Richardson and Smith with Nagle's brigade of Casey's division, were guarding the passage at the swamp. Slocum was on the Charles City road, northwest of the church. Kearney was between that road and the Newmarket road. McClellan was on the Newmarket road, with Hooker and Sedgwick behind him, near the church. Porter and Keyes were at Malvern with the trains, two miles distant.

Lee divided his army. Jackson, D. H. Hill, and Ewell followed McClellan down the swamp road, while A. P. Hill, Longstreet, Hugler, Magruder, and Holmes made all haste down the Charles City road from Richmond to strike McClellan on the flank and divide his army. The president of the Confederacy went out with A. P. Hill to see the Union army cut to pieces.

Jackson reached the bridge across the sluggish stream in the swamp, but it was torn up, and on the southern bank stood Smith's and Richardson's divisions, with Hazard's, Ayres' and Pettit's batteries in position. Jackson brought up all his guns. There was a fierce artillery fight, lasting through the day. Jackson succeeded in getting a small infantry force across towards evening, but it was not strong enough to make an attack, and nothing came of all his efforts to harass the rear.

During the afternoon the Union pickets on the Charles City road discovered A. P. Hill's troops filing off the road, west of Frazier's farm, toward the south. They went across the fields and through the woods to the Newmarket road. While the main body was thus taking position, a small body of infantry and a battery opened fire upon Slocum; but he had cut down the forest in his front, forming an impassable barrier, so that he was secure from attack.

General McClellan formed his division of 6,000 men, with Meade's brigade, north of the road, Seymour's south of it, and Reynolds's—commanded in this battle by Colonel Simmons—in reserve. He had five batteries, Randall's on the right, Kern's and Cooper's in the center, and Dietrich's and Kanerbin's on the left. All in front of his infantry, looking down a gentle slope upon an open field; on the west there was a brook fringed with a forest growth, with the farm of Mr. Frazier beyond.

HILL'S ATTACK.

It was 2:30 before Hill was ready to make the attack. He threw out two regiments as skirmishers, which advanced to feel of McClellan's lines, but they were repulsed by the 7th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. Hill had twelve brigades—six of his own and six of Longstreet's. Magruder and Hugler had not arrived. His plan was to strike with all his force at once.

Brigade after brigade advanced, but recoiled before the direct fire of the batteries, sustained by the infantry.

The thunder of the cannon, the cracking of the musketry from thousands of combatants, mingled with screams from the wounded and dying, were terrible to the ear and to the imagination," says a Southern correspondent.

"Volleys upon volleys streamed across our front in such quick succession that it seemed impossible for any human being to live under it," writes another Confederate correspondent.

Five o'clock! The battle has raged two hours and a half, sustained wholly by McClellan, and Hill has not driven him an inch.

The Confederates desired their direct attack in front, and throw all their force upon Seymour's left, south of the road. McClellan sends the 5th and 8th regiments from his second line.

"Change front with the infantry and artillery," is his order.

Hill is pushing along his left flank to gain his rear.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

Pan in His Glory on the Field of Battle.

MCCLELLAN'S DEFENSE.

Veatch's Brigade Takes a Hand in the Fray.

THE VALLEY OF DEATH.

Sherman Finds His Position Turned and Falls Back.

VI.

The scene of wild confusion that reigned on Shiloh battlefield for three hours after the assault upon Hildebrand was never again witnessed by the Army of the Tennessee.

Like a pack of hungry wolves upon a sheepfold the yelping Confederates closed upon the Union camps. The air, sulphurous with the smoke of powder, was rent with the crash of musketry, the roar of artillery, and the shouts of officers striving to make themselves heard above the din of battle, in the vain attempt to restore order to their commands. Wounded horses, maddened with pain and wild with fright, rushed across the field or, falling prone upon the ground, crushed their hapless riders beneath their struggling forms. To add to the terror of the scene, and to convince even the coolest and bravest of the hopelessness of the struggle, a never-ceasing column of Confederate troops, emerging from the woods, deployed in constantly accumulating force into line of battle in support of those already engaged.

Pressing forward over their fallen comrades, closing the wide gaps torn in their ranks by repeated volleys of artillery and musketry, yelling like demons, they seemed utterly reckless of the leader's fall that strewed the ground with the quivering forms of the dead and dying. Driven back again and again, they rushed forward to the assault with redoubled fury after each bloody repulse.

RAITH'S BRIGADE DRIVEN BACK.

Raith's brigade had gallantly withstood the shock of Hindman's impetuous charge, but after a brief though sharp resistance was swept away, and three guns of Waterhouse's battery captured. The 17th Illinois formed in support of Schwartz's battery and held their ground until, in the general movement towards the second line, the battery was withdrawn without the loss of a gun. A few moments later Colonel Raith fell mortally wounded. The reports of the regimental commanders unite in attributing the necessity of retreat to the failure of ammunition, no adequate arrangements having been made to supply the troops while on the line of defense. Adjutant Ryan reports the entire brigade out of ammunition within two hours after the opening of the conflict.

MARSH'S BRIGADE OVERWHELMED.

The 2d brigade of McClellan's division was scarcely less unfortunate. Colonel Marsh rushed rapidly towards the front at about eight o'clock and formed his brigade—the 11th, 20th, 45th, and 48th Illinois—in support of Burrows' battery, which had scarcely taken position when the Confederates opened upon it a deadly fire. The regiments engaged on this line were at Fort Donelson, where their ranks had been decimated in battle. But little over fifteen hundred officers and men took their places in line. Colonel Marsh says: "Moving rapidly to the left I was assigned a position by General McClellan, which I had scarcely assumed when the enemy were seen approaching in large force and fine style, column after column moving on us with the steadiness and precision which I had scarcely anticipated. General McClellan then ordered forward a battery (Barrows') to the center of the brigade, which had not fairly taken position when the enemy opened on us with a most terrible and deadly fire, unequalled by any which we were under during the subsequent engagements of the day and Monday. During the first five minutes I lost more in killed and wounded than in all the other actions. Lieutenant Colonel Ransom and Major Nevins of the 11th, Major Bartleson of the 20th, Colonel Haynie and Lieutenant Colonel Sanford of the 45th, with numerous officers of the line, were here wounded. The effect of loss so many field officers so suddenly was soon felt, the 48th yielding first, soon followed by the other regiments of the brigade. In spite of my efforts to compel them to stand they fell back, and with a precipitancy as mortifying as it was unusual, and only to be accounted for by the loss of so many of their officers; for in all subsequent engagements in which we took part their conduct was such as to meet my hearty approval."

HARE'S BRIGADE RETIRES IN CONFUSION.

Colonel Abraham M. Hare, commanding McClellan's 1st brigade, has left the following record of the conduct of the afterwards-famous Crocker brigade on the morning of this day of disaster: "I received orders about 8 o'clock a. m. to move three regiments to the left of the 2d brigade. The 5th and 18th Illinois and 13th Iowa were accordingly ordered to form in line of battle in that position, and moving in double quick formed in good order in a skirt of woods bordering on a field, the 18th Illinois on the left and the 13th Iowa on the right. At the same time I was ordered to form a regiment on the right of the 2d brigade, which position, by my orders, the Eleventh Iowa, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Hall, immediately took, and with a battery, formed a reserve for the time being. After seeing the order executed I joined the three regiments at their position on the left, as above stated. Upon arriving at that point I found this portion of my brigade there formed under the fire of the enemy's cannon and musketry. On the right was a battery of our guns, supported by infantry still on its right. Against the battery the principal fire of the enemy was directed, and large bodies of infantry were moving around the field in its direction. A charge being made by these bodies of the enemy's infantry, directed upon the battery and our infantry on the right, they broke and retired in great disorder. Seeing the enemy approaching in great numbers, and our troops on the right having given way, my regiments also broke and retired in confusion."

WHAT COLONEL BUCKLAND SAYS.

"Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning I was informed that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the brigade on the color line, which was promptly done. About this time I was informed that the pickets were being driven in. I ordered the 48th Ohio, Colonel Sullivan, to advance in support of the pickets, which he did, but discovered that the enemy had advanced in force to the creek about thirty or one hundred rods in front. I immediately ordered the brigades to advance in line of battle. We had marched about thirty to forty rods when we discovered the enemy, and opened fire upon him along the whole line, which checked his advance and caused him to fall back. Discovering that he was pushing a column up a narrow ravine, which extended from the left of the 72d Ohio to the flat at the creek, bearing somewhat to the right, I ordered the 72d to change front, so as to form a line parallel to the ravine extending down to the flat, company B forming an angle across the head of the ravine. In this position one line was maintained for more than two hours under a deadly fire from the enemy. Officers and men behaved with great coolness and bravery, keeping

(Continued on 8th page.)

VEATCH'S BRIGADE, FLANKED, FALLS BACK.

Colonel Veatch, commanding Hurlbut's 2d brigade, which responded to Sherman's call for re-enforcements, had but little time to examine the ground where he was directed to form his brigade. They had scarcely deployed into line when the troops in their front broke and rushed through the lines of the 15th and 40th Illinois, leaving those regiments to withstand the steady advance of the Confederates, who, confident of victory, urged on by the animating cheers of their officers, had gained possession of the ground in front of McClellan's camps, and were driving all before them. A continuous sheet of flame poured from the muzzles of their guns as they pressed forward in front and on the flank of the brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis held his ground heroically, returning the fire with deadly effect, but soon fell from his horse with a mortal wound. Major Godard was killed, and the 15th, deprived of its field officers, fell back, but retained its organization.

Colonel Veatch says: "The enemy was moving another heavy column on the point occupied by Colonel Davis, of the 48th Illinois. The line in front of him broke and rushed through his ranks, throwing them into confusion. As soon as these scattered troops had cleared his front he poured in a well-directed fire upon the enemy, which for a time checked his progress; but it was impossible to hold his position against a force so far superior. Major Dornbush was severely wounded, a large number of his company officers disabled, and his color-guard shot down. Colonel Davis seized his colors and bore them from the field, presenting a most noted mark for the enemy, who sent after him a terrific fire as he retired. I directed him to fall back and rally his men in the rear of the fresh troops that were then advancing."

"The force of the enemy at this point now fell on the 14th Illinois and 25th Indiana. These regiments met the fire with firmness and returned it with great spirit, changing front in good order, so as to meet the enemy in the new direction in which he was now advancing and attempting to flank us on the right. They held the ground with great determination until ordered to fall back, to save them from being surrounded by a very superior force."

PRENTISS FALLS BACK ON HURLBUT.

Thus, for two hours McClellan's division and Veatch's brigade of Hurlbut's division were fighting on Sherman's left and some distance in advance of Wallace. The attack fell upon the latter about the time that Prentiss, finding his line turned on both flanks, was falling slowly back upon the line of Hurlbut and Wallace, and between whose divisions he reformed his line about 10 o'clock, while retreating from his first position. Prentiss's request for re-enforcements was responded to by General Hurlbut, who, in command of his two remaining brigades, advanced to Prentiss's left, where he formed line of battle, allowing the regiments of Prentiss' division that were out of ammunition to fall back, filling the uncovered space with his fresh troops. The rout of Hildebrand, followed by the retirement of McClellan and Prentiss to the second line, exposed Sherman to the fury of the Confederate assault. From 7 o'clock until 10 the storm of battle raged along the whole line and the reserves were all engaged on the Confederate side within two hours after the opening of the conflict.

BUCKLAND'S LINE INTACT.

Bragg's whole corps had been pushed forward into the first line, and Johnston, finding that the Union left was giving way under the hammering strokes of Ruggles and Withers, turned his attention to the Union right, whose broken front still resisted every effort to turn it. While he had hurled his brigades upon Prentiss, McClellan, and Stuart, he had not neglected Sherman's right wing. Almost simultaneously with the advance of the Confederate right, his left, under the personal command of Hardee, attacked the position held by Buckland and McDowell north of Shiloh Church. This position was the strongest, naturally, in the whole line. What was a valley in Hildebrand's front became a morass as the stream neared its confluence with Owl Creek in front of McDowell. W. P. Johnston calls it "the valley of death." Basil Duke says: "Every demonstration made against it was repulsed. Artillery was used in vain against it. Some of the best brigades in the army moved on it only to be hurled back and drove the waves in its front with the dead. The Confederates lost at this point was frightful. At last, after having held the position from 7 until 10 a. m., everything upon its left having been driven back, and the Confederate artillery having reached a point where the guns could play upon its rear, it was abandoned as no longer tenable." He adds: "The tenacious defense of this position and the fact that by passing on his own right General Johnston turned it when it proved impregnable to direct assault, ought to be of itself a sufficient explanation of his plan of battle." Jackson's brigade attacked the left of McClellan's line, and Anderson's right, followed by Wood and Snicker after Prentiss was driven back. Having Cleburne's part of Pond's and the left wing of Anderson's brigades to engage Buckland's and the 40th Illinois, of McDowell's brigades, the 6th Iowa and the 48th Ohio, of the latter brigade, remained in position on the extreme right of the line, but were not attacked previous to the retirement of the division to the line of the Parly road.

WHAT COLONEL BUCKLAND SAYS.

"Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning I was informed that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the brigade on the color line, which was promptly done. About this time I was informed that the pickets were being driven in. I ordered the 48th Ohio, Colonel Sullivan, to advance in support of the pickets, which he did, but discovered that the enemy had advanced in force to the creek about thirty or one hundred rods in front. I immediately ordered the brigades to advance in line of battle. We had marched about thirty to forty rods when we discovered the enemy, and opened fire upon him along the whole line, which checked his advance and caused him to fall back. Discovering that he was pushing a column up a narrow ravine, which extended from the left of the 72d Ohio to the flat at the creek, bearing somewhat to the right, I ordered the 72d to change front, so as to form a line parallel to the ravine extending down to the flat, company B forming an angle across the head of the ravine. In this position one line was maintained for more than two hours under a deadly fire from the enemy. Officers and men behaved with great coolness and bravery, keeping

(Continued on 8th page.)

COL. ROE'S NEW STORY.

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THE GRAY AND THE BLUE.

A Glance at a Grand Jury at Work.

THE TELL-TALE PLATE.

Miss Genevieve Makes a very Unpleasant Discovery.

By Lt.-Col. E. R. Roe, Author of "Brought to Bay," etc.
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CHAPTER XIII.

A GRAND JURY AT WORK.

In all free governments organized after the similitude of English law, a grand jury is thought to be a very sacred institution. It protects the life and property of the citizen or party by hearing and giving credit to all charges of crime against him and denying any defense. It is organized to convict; and it is perfectly adapted to that end—without regard to guilt or innocence—as any merely human institution could reasonably be expected to be. It is much venerated by nearly all law-abiding people, because it is old, and because they know so little about it. Twenty-three good men and true, chosen from the body of the county,